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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
---------------------------------
VELMA GLADYS YATES, 
vs. 
Plaintiff-
Appellant, 
VERNAL FAMILY HEALTH 
CENTER, a project of the 
Division of Family and 
Community Medicine, 
University of Utah; 
UINTAH COUNTY; UINTAH COUNTY 
HOSPITAL; VERNAL DRUG COM-
PANY, a Utah corporation; 
and GORDON LEE BALKA, M.D., 
Defendants-
Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
VERNAL DRUG COMPANY 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 16602 
This was a malpractice action against a health care 
provider as defined in the Utah Health Care Malpractice 
Act enacted bv the Legislature as Chapter 23, Laws of Utah 
1976, and as amended by Chapter 128, Laws of Utah 1979. 
DISPOSITION I~ THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court dismissed the action because plaintiff 
failed to qive the required prior notice o~ intent to com-
mence an action, as required by the Utah Health Care 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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Malpractice Act. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent Vernal Druq Company seeks affirmance of ~e 
order of dismissal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts necessary for an understanding and a deter-
mination of the claim against respondent Vernal Drug Corrmanl' 
are summarized as follows: 
During an indeterminate perioc'. enclino in March 1978, 
the appellant Velma Gladys Yates was a patient of Gordon 
Lee Balka, M.D., who was a physician em~loyed by respondent 
Vernal Family Heal th Center. During his care of the patient, 
Dr. Balka prescribed numerous and varied medications. 
Prescriptions for these medications were presented to 
Vernal Drug Company, whose pharmacists dispensed the drugs as 
so prescribed. 
The patient was hospitalized in Uintah County Hospital 
March 12, 1977, and after a few days of treatment she was 
transferred to Holy Cross Hospital in Salt Lake City ano 
later was returned to Uintah County Hospital where she 
was discharged about April 12, 1977. 
Nearly a year later, on April 10, 1978, respondent 
Vernal Drug Company was served with a copy of a letter 
reading as follows: 
-2-
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April 7, 1978 
TO: Vernal Family Health Center 
Dr. Lee Balka 
Vernal Drug Company 
Uintah County Hospital 
Gentlemen: 
Pursuant to 78-14-8, UCA, notice is 
herewith given that Marzine Yates, husband 
of Velma Gladys Yates, potentially is assert-
inq and claiming and may com~ence a civil 
action for damages arisinq out of possible 
negligent prescribing, neglioent dispensing 
of drugs or other forms of prescribed medicine, 
and negligent hospitalization and treatment of 
his wife. - In compliance with the aforesaid 
section of the Utah Code, it is believed and 
will be alleged in the event a civil action is 
commenced that from approximately March 1976 
until March 1978, claimant's wife received 
prescriptions from the Vernal Drug Company 
believed to have been prescribed by Dr. Lee 
Balka in his official capacity as a partner or 
responsible agent of the Vernal Family Health 
Center, which prescriptions, in combination of 
use or seperate (sic), were dispensed in an 
excessive amount which has resulted in permanent 
mental damage to claimant's wife. It is further 
believed that as a result of the Prolonqed excess 
abuse of the prescription medicine, the seizure 
and subsequent coma which claimant's wife suffered 
approximately one year aqo were possibly the 
result of nealigence. 
Claimant is unable to supply further infor-
mation about the details of the possible claim 
or the possible believed responsible parties until 
an exam o~ all the books and records of recipients 
of this notice has been accomplished. 
-3-
/s/ Marzine Yates 
Marzine Yates 
/s/ Rebert M. McRae 
Robert M. McRae 
Attorney for Claimant 
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 
7th day of April, 1978. 
/s/ Cleo W, Chew 
NOTARY PVBLIC 
Residing at Vernal, Utah 
Commission Expires Dec. 14, 1978 
Marzine Yates, described in the foregoing letter as a 
"claimant" who "potentially is assertin0 and claiming and m~ 
corrunence a civil action," did not file the threatened suit. 
His letter, alleging negligence during a two-year oeriod 
from March 1976 to March 1978, was neither withdrawn nor 
amended, and it is still pending. 
On July 19, 1978, appellant Velma Gladys Yates filed 
this action, alleging she had been the patient of Dr. Balka 
from December 1975 through March 1978, durinq which period Dr. 
Balka "prescribed medication to plaintiff, and permitted 
plaintiff to receive prescribed drugs and narcotic~which 
resulted in plaintiff's becoming addicted to same .... 
(R. 1, 3.) 
The complaint next alleges that "During the approximate 
fifteen month (sic) period, plaintiff was supplied with 
approximately two hundred seventeen ( 21 7) separate prescripti:· 
or refills of varyina druas and narcotics," resulting in 
seizures and hospitalization ~larch 12, 1977 (P. 2). 
The complaint was filed by aooellant in her own na~c 
-4-
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and without the aid of a guardian ad litem or a conservator. 
She gave no prior notice of her intent to commence the action, 
although such notice was then required by Section 78-14-8, 
Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended, which then read, to the 
extent pertinent here, as follows: 
78-14-8. Notice of intent to commence action. 
No malpractice action against a health care 
provider may be commenced unless and until 
the plaintiff gives the prospective defendant 
or his executor or successor, at least ninety 
days' prior notice o~ intent to col'1IT1ence an 
action. Such notice shall include the nature 
of the claim, the persons involved, the date, 
time and place of the occurrence, the cir-
cumstances thereof, soecific alleoations of 
misconduct on the part of the orospective 
defendant, the nature of the alleoed iniuries 
and other damaaes sustained. Notice may be 
in letter or affidavit form executed by the 
plaintiff and his attorney . 
Appellant's failure to comply with the notice require-
ment of the statute formed the basis ~or this respondent's 
motion to dismiss, with supportino memorandum, dated 
May 14, 1979. The trial court heard arqument on this 
and other motions at the pretrial conference June 8, 1979, 
and on July 16, 1979, the motions were oranteG by the court 
with the followina sirni~icant corn!'lent: 
Plaintiff in reliance uoon Batch v Weber 
County, 23 u2 144, 459 P.2d 436, ~sserts 
that plaintif~ complied suhstantially 
with the notice requirement o~ 78-14-8, 
U.C.A., '53. Nothin0 in the record indi-
cates that Velma Gladys Yates complied 
at all with the statutory notice require-
ment:"- Defendants' motions to dismiss are 
oranted. (Emphasis in original) (R. 218). 
-5-
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The court entered its formal order of dismissal 
July 20, 1979, and this appeal followed, 
ARGU'1ENT 
POINT I 
THE DISMISSAL OF THE ACTION FOR FAILURE TO 
COMPLY WITH THE NOTICE REQllIREMENT OF THE 
UTAH HEALTH CARE MALPRACTICE ACT WAS CORRECT 
AND SHOU:SD BE AFFIRMED. 
Appellant claims that the letter of April 7, 1978, 
which identified her husband as the claimant and which was 
signed by her husband and by Robert M. McRae as her 
husband's attorney, should be construed as her compliance 
with the notice requirement of the Utah Health Care Mal-
practice Act. 
Appellant thus concedes that the statute required 
a plaintiff to give prior notice o~ an intent to commence 
a malpractice action, but after so conceding the meaning 
of the statute, she admits that she, as the ultimate ?lain-
tiff, failed to give the required notice, but she does not 
explain that failure. Instead, she contends that the letter 
of April 7, 1978, identifying her husband as the claimant 
should be construed as notice of her intent to file an 
action and that the letter should otherwise be viewed as 
constituting "substantial compliance" with the statute. Whe 
the letter is measured against the statutory yardstick, it 
clearly falls short and it deJTlonstrates that the appellart's 
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contention must fail. 
First, the statute requires that the plaintiff must 
give the prior notice of intent to commence an action and 
the notice must be signed by the plaintiff and his attorney. 
In the letter in question, the appellant was never identified 
as the claimant, she never stated an intent to commence an 
action, she did not sign the letter, no one identified as her 
attorney signed it, and for all that appears from the record 
she was totally unaware it had been prepared or served. 
Concerning the statutory requirement that an intent 
to commence an action be expressed, the language of this 
letter is hesitant and uncertain, and thus is inadequate as 
an expression of the required intent. The letter says 
Marzine Yates "potentially is asserting and claiming and may 
commence a civil action for damages (Emphasis 
added.) The uncertainty concerning the intent is enhanced 
by the language of the next sentence in which it is said, 
"It is believed and will be alleaed in the event a civil 
action is commenced ."and it is compounded hy the lan-
guaqe of the last paraaraph of the letter which refers to 
details ''of the possible claim" or the "possible believed 
responsible parties." (Emphasis added.) 
Even if the appellant had been identified as the 
claimant and had signed the letter as the claimant, together 
with her attorney, the letter would not fulfill the mandatory 
requirements of Section 78-14-8. The statute states: 
-7-
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Such notice shall include the nature of the 
claim, the persons involved, the date, time 
and place of the occurr€nce, the circumstances 
thereof, specific alleaations of misconduct 
on the part of the prospective defendant, the 
nature of the alleged injuries and other damage 
sustained (Emphasis added) . 
When the April 7 letter is compared with the require-
ments of the statute the following inadequacies are apparent: 
1. Nature of Claim. The letter states 
that there was "possible negligent prescribing, 
negligent dispensing of druas or other forms 
of prescribed medicine. ," that Mr. Yates' 
wife "received prescriptions from the Vernal 
Drug Company believed to have been prescribed 
by Dr. Lee Balka . . which prescriptions, in 
combination of use or seperate (sic) were dis-
pensed in an excessive amount." From this it 
cannot be determined whether the potential claim 
would involve excessive amounts of medication 
prescribed by Dr. Balka or proper amounts of 
such medication dispensed in violation of the 
doctor's instruction. Moreover, it cannot be 
determined whether the claimant contended that 
it was Dr. Balka's fault, or that of the drug 
company, that the drugs were prescribed and 
dispensed in combinations which would harm the 
recipient. 
2. The Persons Involved. No attempt was 
made to identify any employee of Vernal Drug 
Company, although it is to be assumed that 
a two-year peribd of purchases in a small town 
drugstore would have led to sufficient familiarity 
with persons involved for them to have been 
identified. 
3. The Date, Time and Place of the Occur-
rence. The only dates specified by Marzine Yates 
are March 1976 to March 1978. However, the com-
plaint subsequently filed by the appellant alleges 
a time period from December 1975 through March 1978, 
a period of more than two and one-quarter years, but 
-8-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the time period is blurred by a subsequent alle-
gation in the complaint that Plaintiff was supplied 
with the medications "during the approximate 15 
month period" which ended when the plaintiff 
suffered seizures and was hospitaliz.ed March 12, 1977, 
4. Specific Allegations of Misconduct on the 
Part of the Prospective Defendant. The uncertainty 
of the allegations made by Marzine Yates concern-
ing the conduct of the defendants, as described in 
paragraph 1 above, is equally applicable here. It 
cannot be determined whether the letter charaed 
that Dr. Balka described too many medications in 
improper combinations or whether it was contended 
that Vernal Drug Company violated its duty by 
failing to dispense medicines as the doctor had 
prescribed. 
5. Nature of the Alleged Injuries. On the 
subject of damage, the letter siqned by Marzine 
Yates states that his wife had sustained "permanent 
mental damage" but no further details of the alleged 
damage were set forth, although Yates expressed the 
belief that "the seizure and subsequent coma which 
claimant's wife suffered approximately one year 
ago were possibly the result of negligence." In 
the light of the allegations against the other 
prospective defendants, this respondent certainly 
could not determine what injuries or other damage 
were allegedly caused by its conduct. 
On page 7 of this brief, respondent has emphasized 
four significant facts concernina the letter of April 7, 
1978: appellant was not named as the claimant, she did 
not state an intent to commence an action, she did not 
sian the letter, and the attorney who did sian identified 
himself as attorney for "claimant," who had been described 
or identified at least five times in the letter as Marzine 
Yates, apoellant's husband. 
These facts assume even qreater sianif icance in the 
light of the circumstances which are obvious from the letter 
-9-
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itself. The letter was prepared on the letterhead of an 
attorney who has recoqnized knowledce and ability in the 
practice of personal injury law. As of the date of the 
letter, the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act had been in 
effect more than two years and its terms were presumptively 
known and understood by that attorney. Indeed, the letter 
cited a section of the Act and claimed comoliance with that 
section. 
These circumstances stroncly suggest that the failure 
to identify appellant as the claimant, her failure to state 
an intent to sue and her failure to sicn the letter were 
deliberate and intentional and, at that time, Marzine Yates 
was in actual fact the claimant, actina for himself. 
This conclusion is strengtheneC\ by the absence of any 
other explanation by or on behalf of the appellant, either 
here or in the trial court. As this respondent previouslv 
observed, for all that can be found in this record, appellar.:. 
was totally unaware that the letter had been ?repared or 
served. 
Appellant contends in her brief that her failure to 
give notice of her intent to commence an action and the 
inadequacies of her husband's notice should be held by this 
Court to be of no consequence because the various responden::. 
had actual notice of her claim. She araues that to regui~ 
-10-
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"strict and technical compliance" with the notice statute 
"would be an obvious injustice" and asserts it was not the 
intent of the legislature "to create a technical stumbling 
block for unwary plaintiffs" (appellant's brief, pp. 9, 10, 
11). 
These contentions should be rejected. This Court 
should not be asked to ignore or rewrite legislation, 
particularly when the statute in question was obviously the 
product of careful Legislative consideration. If the 
Legislature had intended that its enactment should be 
construed as urged by the appellant, it could have so 
provided without the detailed requirements of the notice 
specified in Section 8. The appellant failed to comply 
with the statute and she should not be permitted to excuse 
that failure by minimizing the statute as a "technical stumbling 
block for unwary plaintiffs." 
Appellant, in effect, is requesting that the specific 
language in the statute be ignored or that the words e~ployed 
should not be construed according to their usual meanings. 
Such a request is in contradiction to the established law of 
statutory construction as founn in Section 68-3-11, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, which provides "Words and phrases are to be 
construed according to the context and the approved usaae of 
the language; . 
-11-
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In her attempt to minimize or to ne0ate the manifest 
intent of the Legislature when it adopted the Utah Health 
Care Malpractice Act, appellant has failed to consider the 
significance of the action taken by the 1979 Legislature 
when it reviewed and amended Section 8. As this Court 
pointed out in Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144 (September 
1979), the 1979 Legislature fully considered House Bill 164 
which was offered to amend portions of Section 8 but which, 
as finally adopted unanimously, did not make substantial 
change in the notice requirements of the statute. It is 
thus seen that the Legislature had the entire section before 
it for consideration and it chose to reaffirm the language 
which is relevant to the controversy in this case. 
In her attempt to justify her failure to comply with 
the notice statute, appellant noted in her brief at page 4 
that since the statute had only recently been enacted, there 
was no case decision to aid in its interpretation and 
appellant thus resorted to an examination of cases involvinc 
other legal controversies in an attempt to support her cla~ 
that the notice sent by her husband should be construed as 
"substantial compliance" with the Utah Heal th Care Maloracu:' 
Act. Appellant's reliance upon case decisions in other 
controversies is misplaced. 
For example, decisions construino the Utah Governf'1ent:. 
Im.TTluni ty Act ha\'e consistently held that the notice regdre" 
-12-
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under that Act mean what they say and the inforJ11ation 
required by the statutory language must be supplied or 
the action will fail. See Varoz v. Sevey, 506 P.2d 435 
(Utah 1973); Gallegos v. Midvale City, 491 P.2d 1335 
(Utah 1972), and Scarborough v. Granite School District, 
531 P.2d 480 (Utah 1975). 
While it is true there have not been many decisions 
of this Court which have considered the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act, those decisions which have reviewed the 
Act have given full recognition to its provisions. In 
Vealy v. Clegg, 579 P.2d 919 (Utah 1978), this Court 
confirmed that an action could not be commenced until the 
notice required by Section 8 had been given (the Legis-
lature, in its 1979 session, ef~ectively overturned that 
portion of Vealy which retroactively applied the notice 
requirement, but the principle of t~e case still stands). 
Moreover, in four separate cases which were combined 
for argument and reported by this Court November 1, 1979, 
the Court gave implicit recognition to the statute and 
it neither minimized its effect nor challenged its provisions. 
See McGuire v. University of Utah Medical Center: Hackney, et al., 
v. Rumel Chest Clinic, et al.; White v. Intermountain Health 
Care, Inc., et al.; Cleghorn v. Schow, et al., all of which 
were decided November 1, 1979, and may be found at 603 P.2d 
786. 
-13-
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POINT II 
APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO PROVE HER CLAIM THAT 
THE UTAH HEALTH CAPE MALPRACTICE ACT IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL, AND HER CLAIM SHOULD 
THEREFORE BE DENIED. 
In her attack upon the constitutionality of the 
Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, the appellant contends, 
at page 20 of her brief, that for the Act to be constitu-
tional, "it must be shown that a medical malpractice 
crisis does in fact exist in Utah, that a classification 
based upon the lines of health care providers and non-
health care providers is not arbitrary, and that the 
legislation does in fact reduce the number and amount 
of medical malpractice awards. Absent such a showing, the 
Utah Health Care Malpractice Act must be delcared (sic) 
unconstitutional as violative of equal protection." 
The appellant did not raise this issue in the trial 
court in any pleading, memorandum or oral arqument. It has 
long been the rule in this and other iurisdictions that 
an appellant who failed to present an issue int he trial 
court will not be permitted to present it for the first 
time on appeal. For the most recent expression of this 
rule, see State of Utah v. Daniel Lee Laird, 601 P.2d 926 
(Utah 1979). 
If the Court nevertheless aqrees to consider this 
issue, it should be obvious that the appellant has incorrec' 
assumed that the Legislature has the burden of provino t~• 2 : 
its enactments are constitutional and she has failed to 
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recognize that she has the burden of proving her contention 
that a statute violates the Constitution. This Court has 
so ruled repeatedly as exemplified in its 1968 decision 
in Trade Commission of Utah v. Skaogs nrua Centers, Inc., 
446 P.2d 958, and in the more recent decision of Crowder v. 
Salt Lake County, 552 P.2d 646 (Utah 1976). 
The appellant has failed to establish that the challenged 
Act is constitutionally infirm and she has thus failed in her 
burden of proof. In the absence of such proof, this Court 
should follow the principles contained in its decision in 
Trade Commission of Utah v. Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc., ~· 
where it said: 
In order to preserve the independence and the 
integrity of the three branches of govern-
ment, it is of the utmost importance that 
the judicial exercise restraint and not in-
trude into the legislative prerogative. 
It cannot strike down and nullify a legis-
lative enactment unless it is clearly and 
expressly prohibited by the Constitution 
or in violation of some plain mandate thereof. 
The court must make every reasonable pre-
sumption which favors constitutionality. 
The courts have a dutv to investigate and, 
insofar as possible, discover any reasonable 
avenues by which the statute can be upheld. 
Every reasonable doubt must be resolved in 
favor of the constitutionality of the statute. 
Those who assert the invalidity of the statute 
must bear the burden of showing it to be 
unconstitutional. 446 P.2d at 962. 
CONCLUSION 
In dismissing the action, the trial court properly 
noted "nothina in the record indicates that Velma Gladys 
Yates complied at all with the statutory notice requirements." 
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(Emphasis in original.) 'l'he accuracy of this observation 
is apparent when it is realized that the only notice 
given was found in the April 7 letter, which did not name 
the appellant as a claimant, which was not signed by her 
nor by anyone identified as her attorney. 
Aside from these deficiencies, the letter itsel! fails 
to meet the statutory requirements of notice required in 
Section 8 of the Act, and thus the trial court correctly 
dismissed the action because appellant failed to comply with 
its specific terms. 
Appellant failed to urge the constitutional issue in 
the trial court, and when she undertook to raise it here, 
she failed to carry her burden of proof on the issue of 
constitutionality and thus her contention in that respect 
must also fail. 
Accordingly, the order of dismissal of the action 
against this respondent should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GAYLF F. McKEAC~~IE 
and 
JO~N H. SNOW 
By .A---..__ ~. -- -!:D 
John H. Snow 
Att ys for Respondent 
Vernal Drug Company 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the 
Brief of Respondent Vernal Drug Company, postage prepaid, 
this 27th day of February, 1980, to the followinq: 
Robert M. McRae, Esq., 72 East 4th South #355, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, 84111, attorney for Appellant Yates; 
William T. Evans, Esq., 25 South Wolcott, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84112, attorney for Respondent Vernal Family 
Health Center; 
Leonard H. Russon, Esq., 702 Kearns Buildinq, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84101, attorney for Respondents Uintah 
County and Uintah County Hospital: and 
D. Gary Christian, Esq., 600 Commercial Club Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, attorney for Respondent Balka. 
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